OPINION

Vital maritime laws

Filipino maritime law experts say the two laws immediately benefit Filipino fishermen and law enforcement agencies since these set down clearly where and what sea resources can and can’t be legally exploited.

Nick V. Quijano Jr.

Following last week’s enactment of two “foundational” maritime laws, a new Filipino specific and explicit maritime strategy against China’s expansionist and belligerent ambitions in the West Philippine Sea (WPS) is definitely moving forward.

Last Friday, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. signed into law the Maritime Zones Act and the Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act.

Both laws formally define the country’s internal waters, archipelagic waters, territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, and continental shelf as well the legal authority and rights to the resources found within these boundaries.

Filipino maritime law experts say the two laws immediately benefit Filipino fishermen and law enforcement agencies since these set down clearly where and what sea resources can and can’t be legally exploited.

Crucial, meanwhile, is the fact that the two domestic laws are aligned with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal ruling which set the boundaries of the country’s maritime territories, including its claim in the WPS.

Strategically speaking, the emphasis on adhering to international legal standards indicates the administration’s adherence to the “rules-based order” when dealing with conflicts with our neighbors.

Still, such clarities on our maritime boundaries anger China.

Immediately following the signing of the two laws, China’s foreign ministry summoned the Philippine ambassador to lodge a “stern protest” and to summarily condemn the move as an infringement on her sovereignty, as well as an attempt to “solidify the illegal ruling of the South China Sea arbitration case through domestic legislation.”

The immediate cause of China’s vehement objection was the Arbitral Tribunal’s ruling that China violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights in its exclusive economic zone by interfering in Filipino fishing and petroleum exploration activities, constructing artificial islands and failing to prevent Chinese fishermen from exploiting Filipinos’ traditional fishing grounds.

On the strategic level, China is obviously riled by the fact that the country’s clear maritime boundaries directly challenge China’s evident deliberate strategy of ambiguity.

Uncertainty rules China’s strategy in the WPS and elsewhere in the South China Sea (SCS), strategy experts say.

As one American expert put it: “Rather than make explicit legally cognizable claims, Chinese officials have for decades declined to define the scope and substance of their territorial and jurisdictional claims.”

This strategic ambiguity is clear in the infamous sweeping “nine-dash line” and China’s frequent use of coercive grey zone tactics to bolster her claims.

Ambiguity also drives China’s stubborn insistence on bilateral negotiations when dealing with territorial conflicts involving her maritime neighbors.

On this, policy wags often point out that not one of the rival claimants in the South China Sea have managed to settle their maritime boundary issues with China.

Nor do any of the rival claimants have any meaningful bilateral negotiations underway with Beijing regarding disputed territorial sovereignty and maritime jurisdictions.

In the meantime, the two new laws give momentum to the other multi-dimensional policy initiatives of the administration in defending the country’s national interests.

Besides the two laws, in the congressional pipeline are the Blue Economy Bill and crucial defense strategic plans like the National Security Plan and the Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept.

The two laws mandate too that the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (Namria) redraw the Philippine map now that the exact metes and bounds of the country’s maritime zones and archipelagic sea lanes have been determined.

On a more immediate issue, the signing of the two laws also means expanding the current policy pool beyond the administration’s “transparency” initiative it is presently using against Chinese bullying in the WPS.

While the “transparency” policy definitely succeeded in making Filipinos aware of the serious impact of China’s belligerence on the country’s food and energy security interests, the “transparency” initiative is fast losing steam in changing China’s behavior.

China apparently doesn’t care about the damage done to her international reputation, prompting refinements to our strategy and tactics.