The Supreme Court (SC) said criticisms against public officers do not constitute oral defamation or slander when these concern their discharge of official duties—unless done maliciously.
In a decision written by Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen dated 3 December 2023 and posted 16 October 2024, the Supreme Court’s Second Division acquitted Argelyn M. Labargan of grave oral defamation against Aileen R. Macabangon.
Macabangon, a barangay kagawad of Muntay, Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte, mediated a dispute between Labargan and Edna Jumapit in a barangay conciliation to settle it.
One day, as Macabangon was passing by Labargan’s house, the barangay kagawad heard Labargan yell from their terrace that Macabangon was dull, uneducated, ignorant, and biased towards Jumapit; it was heard by . As the terrace was beside a highway, many people heard Labargan.
The Municipal Circuit Trial Court found Labargan guilty of grave oral defamation, and it was upheld by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals.
The SC ruled in acquitting Labargan that offensive remarks against public officers do not constitute defamation if they relate to their discharge of official duties, unless actual malice is proved.
Under Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code, there is oral defamation or slander when (1) there is an allegation of a crime, fault, or flaw; (2) made orally; (3) publicly; (4) maliciously; (5) towards a person, alive or dead; and (6) such allegation tends to cause dishonor on the person defamed.
As the law assumes that a defamatory allegation is malicious or made with knowledge that it is false, the person who made the defamatory remarks has the burden of proving there was no malice.
But the court held that when it comes to defamation against public officers in relation to their duties, the prosecution has the burden to prove there was actual malice in the defamatory remarks.
Likewise, it recognizes that the right to free speech empowers citizens to hold public officers accountable because public office is a public trust.
Macabangon being a public officer, Labargan’s statements against her were criticisms of her competence as a barangay governor, specifically her supposed bias against Labargan in the barangay conciliation proceedings.
As the statements relate to Macabangon’s duties, the prosecution must prove actual malice on the part of Labargan, which it failed to do.
The SC stressed in its ruling that while Labargan’s statements against Macabangon may be offensive, they are not actionable by themselves.
“Being ‘sensitive’ has no place in this line of service, more so when allowing otherwise has the potential to create a chilling effect on the public,” that is, citizens will be afraid to criticize public officers.