The Supreme Court stated that criticisms of public officers related to their official duties do not constitute oral defamation or slander, unless such remarks are made with malice.
In a decision written by Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen dated 3 December 2023 and posted 16 October 2024, the Supreme Court’s Second Division acquitted Argelyn M. Labargan of grave oral defamation against Aileen R. Macabangon.
Macabangon, a barangay kagawad of Muntay, Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte, mediated a dispute between Labargan and Edna Jumapit during a barangay conciliation session. One day, while passing by Labargan’s house, Macabangon heard Labargan shouting from their terrace that he was dull, uneducated, ignorant, and biased toward Jumapit. Since the terrace was adjacent to a highway, many people overheard Labargan's remarks.
The Municipal Circuit Trial Court found Labargan guilty of grave oral defamation and it was upheld by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals.
The SC ruled in acquitting Labargan, that offensive remarks against public officers do not constitute defamation if they relate to their discharge of official duties unless actual malice is proved.
Under Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code, there is oral defamation or slander when (1) there is an allegation of a crime, fault, or flaw; (2) made orally; (3) publicly; (4) maliciously; (5) towards a person, alive or dead; and (6) such allegation tends to cause dishonor on the person defamed.
As the law assumes that a defamatory allegation is malicious, or made with knowledge that it is false, the person who made the defamatory remarks has the burden of proving there was no malice.
But the court held when it comes to defamation against public officers about their duties, the prosecution has the burden to prove there was actual malice in the defamatory remarks.
Likewise, it recognizes that the right to free speech empowers citizens to hold public officers accountable because public office is a public trust.
As a public officer, Macabangon was subject to criticisms regarding her competence as a barangay kagawad, particularly concerning her alleged bias against Labargan during the barangay conciliation proceedings. Since the statements pertained to Macabangon's official duties, the prosecution needed to prove actual malice on Labargan's part, which it failed to do.
The Supreme Court emphasized in its ruling that while Labargan's remarks about Macabangon may have been offensive, they are not actionable on their own. The Court stated, “Being ‘sensitive’ has no place in this line of service, especially when allowing otherwise could create a chilling effect on the public,” meaning that citizens may hesitate to criticize public officers.