Earlier this year, the Supreme Court decided on a case that has significant implications on holding public officers and employees accountable. Through Justice Antonio T. Kho Jr.’s ponencia in Nicolas Sr. vs Task Force Abono-Field Investigation Office (G.R. No. 246114, 26 July 2023), the administrative offense of “conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service” has finally been conclusively construed. Its construction would change the way public officers are held answerable for their wrongdoings.
The case revolved around Nicolas, a former provincial treasurer, who issued a certification of cash availability for the disbursement of funds originally allocated for the Department of Agriculture’s Farm Inputs and Farm Implements Program (FIFIP). But instead of utilizing the allocated funds for such purpose, Nicolas approved the disbursement for another project. This prompted the Commission on Audit to issue an Audit Observation Memorandum, highlighting the irregularities in the use and disbursement of the funds originally intended for the FIFIP to other projects.
Both the Ombudsman and the Court of Appeals found Nicolas administratively liable for grave misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
When Nicolas appealed to the Supreme Court, the High Court still affirmed the findings of administrative liability, but ONLY for dishonesty and grave misconduct. Nicholas was absolved of the administrative charge of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
What does it truly mean for a public officer to commit “conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service?”
To answer this, the Supreme Court thoroughly surveyed jurisprudence from way back in 1949 up to the present and it observed a pattern. Those who were found guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, or absolved thereof, were always found to be so in conjunction with other administrative offenses such as dishonesty, negligence, incompetence, misconduct, insubordination, and/or conduct unbecoming of a public official, among others.
The Supreme Court noticed that the pattern by which the Court had decided always merged conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service with one or some other administrative offense.
Deviating from this path, the Supreme Court singled out a few cases that attempted to identify a distinct feature of the administrative offense. The Court noted some: tarnishing the image or integrity of the public service, or acts or omissions violating the norm of public accountability. Notably, the Court emphasized that this specific offense need not be related to or connected with the public officer’s official functions. Thus, the Court concluded that the definition of “conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service” was broader as it encompassed all transgressions which may put a particular public office in a bad light.
However, despite a clearer definition, the Supreme Court acknowledged that an act or omission that may be considered conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service can ostensibly fall under one or more of the administrative offenses already found in the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS) or Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS).
After all, these acts or omissions would always affect, in one way or another, the image or integrity of the public service. Thus, the Court concluded that when erring public officers or employees are found liable for an administrative offense specifically enumerated under the applicable Civil Service Rules, they can no longer be held liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for the same act or omission.
This was the reason why Nicolas was not found administratively liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Such was in view of his culpability for grave misconduct and dishonesty.
To guide the bench, the bar, and the public, the Supreme Court adopted guidelines in determining and applying the conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service in administrative cases. The administrative offense need not be related to the performance of official duty, as long as it tarnished the image or integrity of the public service. But in evaluating such, the act or omission must not already constitute an administrative offense under the URACCS or RRACCS, as applicable.
If the act or omission is an administrative offense specifically under URACCS or RRACCS, then there must no longer be an additional charge of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. But if the act or omission does not or cannot fall under the URACCS or RRACCS, then the charge may be conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
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