COMMENTARY

PCG’s problematic dualism

Something explains this duality, but it may require assessment as to whether it must continue to have this dual character.

Primer Pagunuran

There is a world of difference between the roles of a civilian agency and those of a military command. No civilian agency or military command should be doing the role of the other, lest they overlap, conflict, or render redundant their authority.

The role of the Philippine Coast Guard is a good subject for legislative review — whether it fulfills a purely civilian function or a purely military one. The fact that it's an attached agency of the Department of Transportation as much as an attached service of the Department of National Defense "confers" upon it a dualism that may be at cross purposes.

While the PCG can fit either role, it shouldn't. For in so doing, the line between maritime law enforcement and national defense is blurred.  One may be led to think that, perforce, the PCG is unadulteratedly a military organization as it used to be part of the Philippine Navy, a major branch of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

Something explains this duality, but it may require assessment as to whether it must continue to have this dual character. In principle, any individual or unit that performs a task or mandate that essentially belongs solely to the military must forthwith be under a military commander or military organization.

Who can even begin to fathom what it means when the Commandant of the Philippine Coast Guard reports directly to the Transportation Secretary in the enforcement of maritime law, but also reports to the Defense Secretary if not the President in wartime? If one should take a cursory look at those who served as commandants of the PCG since its founding in 1967 under different presidents, one would find, viz.:

1) During Rodrigo Duterte's term, only three served for over a year, while four served for less than a year, and one for only 18 days;

2) Under Benigno Aquino, four barely completed a year, one just a year, and one more than two years;

3) Under Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, three served for barely a year, two served over two years or so;

4) Under Joseph Estrada, one served for two years;

5) In Fidel Ramos' time, five served for less than a year, one for 32 days, and one for almost three years;

6) Under Corazon Aquino, two served for two years, one for three years, and two for a week or so;

7) Under Ferdinand Marcos Sr., four served for over a year, three served for 3, 4, 5 years, respectively.

This tells us that commandants, as presidential appointees, must be the personal choices of the presidents they serve. With a change of the occupant in Malacañang, a change in the leadership of the PCG also takes place, good or bad.

It's said that the PCG's "transformation into a non-military organization" and its "civilian character" allowed it "to receive offers of vessels, equipment, technology, services, cooperation and other needed assistance from other countries," that otherwise would not have been feasible were it a military agency.

President Fidel Ramos signed Executive Order 475 on 30 March 1998 to separate the PCG from the Philippine Navy, and Executive Order 477 to transfer it from the DND to the DoTC, a month thereafter.

Thus, even FM Jr. has been heard saying, "Our friends from other countries will help strengthen the PCG's capabilities."

Today, the President envisions the PCG as a "central actor" insofar as West Philippine Sea matters are concerned; thus, he ordered several 40-foot long patrol vessels to be built in Cebu to improve the PCG's capabilities in maritime territorial disputes. In the face of China's unprecedented coast guard expansion — the largest in the world — "civilianizing" the PCG makes little sense.

It's a Catch-22 on how to "reinvent" the PCG. Military strategists had miserably failed.