Recalibrating Phl-U.S. treaty alliance

Recalibrating Phl-U.S. treaty alliance | Daily Tribune

The recent ASEAN Summit in Malaysia highlighted a striking asymmetry in US trade policy. The US granted favorable to zero-tariff access to Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia under its new trade framework, excluding its only treaty ally and host of nine US military bases, the Philippines.

This economic move underscores an obvious misalignment between Washington’s rhetoric of partnership and its trade priorities. On the bright side, Manila is provided the necessary window to rethink alliance reciprocity and explore strategic economic hedging through China, RCEP, BRICS, and other bilateral or multilateral platforms as it reassesses US base access as a legitimate instrument of leverage to ensure mutual benefits to the alliance.

Some weeks back in a Senate committee hearing on US-Philippine trade negotiations, the DTI was on the receiving end when confronted with questions so difficult to respond to as the trade negotiations had been dragging on with US getting the upper hand as the framework it crafted was in effect and there appeared to be no timeline or any light at the end of the tunnel for Manila’s position to be considered.

Indeed, negotiations between the most powerful country in the world and a third-world economy are already lopsided to begin with. But the senators have some aces up their sleeves. The exclusion of the Philippines from the tariff considerations at the ASEAN summit reinforces the perception that the existing alliance does not yield tangible domestic benefits, while the key economic and preferential advantages afforded to our neighbors weaken Philippine competitiveness in manufacturing and agribusiness.

It appears that being an ally does not guarantee economic advantage but undermines the credibility of the US Indo-Pacific strategy, which depends on trusted and willing partners.

Hosting nine US facilities is the country’s strongest bargaining chip. These bases provide Washington with critical logistics and surveillance, while the economic return for Manila leaves so much to be desired. Moreover, President BBM had publicly admitted that the country can never dodge any conflict should the issue of Taiwan get out of hand.

At least nine otherwise peaceful and quiet Philippine jurisdictions, including their periphery, are in danger of being blown up in a Taiwan-China-US war. Thus, in line with the justification for EDCA’s existence, the Senate may limit the bases to the barest minimum, subject to mutually beneficial arrangements.

Moreover, it should seriously consider deeper engagements with RCEP, leveraging access to markets dominated by China, Japan, and South Korea. The government should dive deeper into engagements of the multipolar global order as represented by BRICS. Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Thailand have long started discussions on potential engagements with BRICS and are within the platform’s ecosystem.

The exclusion of our economy from US tariff privileges despite alliance obligations and the presence of nine US military facilities in the country reveals the fragility and lopsidedness of transactional partnerships with the most powerful nation in the world. The Philippine Senate should assert that the credibility of the alliance rests on both shared security and economic fairness.

By coupling our strategic geography with multilateral engagement through RCEP, BRICS, ASEAN, APEC, and by reassessing the US military footprint in our territorial jurisdiction, the Philippines can redefine its position in the Indo-Pacific from a compliant ally to a confident regional balancer.

In this era of multipolar competition, loyalty without reciprocity may no longer be sustainable, while hedging, done smartly, becomes strategic rather than a display of weakness.