At a time when nearly all Filipino politicians are persons of interest and with some already indicted for corruption, playing the political blame game is logically pointless.

But what are we to make of humiliated politicians resorting to finger-pointing, buck-passing, and proclaiming “it wasn’t me/it wasn’t only me” in the past few days as the flood control thievery issue boils over?

Ordinarily, we can readily conclude that politicians attacking and blaming each other for bad things is plainly about him or her avoiding accountability and getting away from personal responsibility.

But at the same time, we can also see that the blame game is some sort of rational, though self-serving, strategy in politics, particularly considering that political blame games are ultimately about forming and molding the opinions of citizens, the games’ spectators.

In fact, it is this tactical intent about citizens’ opinions and feedback that tells us why the performative and often cacophonous blame games have more to them than previously assumed.

Now, the most striking aspect of the current blame games is the fact that these are taking place in the broader contexts of democratic dissatisfaction, anti-political sentiment and affective polarization.

Of these complex contexts, however, affective polarization —the tendency of partisans to view political rivals negatively and co-partisans positively — easily reveals why the blame game is now part and parcel of the “strategic toolkit” of our scheming yet beleaguered politicians.

As a matter of fact, in recent years, Filipino political behavior and the political landscape have evolved through affective polarization. So much so that the current blame games need to reflect these changes and would probably revise our previous assumption that blame games are generally bad.

At any rate, for our present purposes, our current socio-political landscape did fragment into three “us-them” political configurations: The pro-Marcos, the pro-Duterte and the anti-Marcos/anti-Duterte.

Going by a recent survey on political inclinations, both the pro-Marcos and the anti-Marcos/anti-Duterte camps are gaining influence while the pro-Duterte is losing considerable clout.

And, as readily seen in the news, each configuration practices forms of disruptive “us-them” politics called “wedge politics,” meaning one side always deserves credit while the other sides deserve blame.

In our present situation, “wedge politics” is probably more pronounced between the pro-Marcos and pro-Duterte camps than between the pro-Marcos and ant-Marcos/anti-Duterte camps.

Anyway, notable in their quests for political supremacy is the fact that fanatical partisans stoutly reject facts, distrust institutions and even discard democratic norms “when they serve political opponents, only to support the same ideas once they come from their own political camp.”

Which only means the partisan is less likely to evaluate politicians on the basis of their competence but on the basis of how they position themselves vis-à-vis the actors and structures the partisan has come to despise.

So, would it be correct to say that political group membership conditions blame games; the blame games being played nowadays reveal no other intention than to preach to the converted?

And, as we all know, preaching to the converted is making sure that core partisans keep the course and stay true to the political cause — that is political interests holding on or trying to regain political power.

But, what about us mystified citizens?

One conspicuously bad effect of the blame game and its noises is that we citizens can become less critical, even appreciative of unconventional and undemocratic behavior. And that is tragic for our struggling democracy.