When Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. assumed the presidency in June 2022, he made the unusual decision to name himself the secretary of agriculture. The decision, he said at the time, reflected the urgency of food security amid spiraling prices and low productivity.

Three years later, his record was a mix of measurable outputs and policies that continue to be debated by farmers, economists, and policymakers.

One of his most visible efforts was the acceleration of agrarian reform. Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) data showed that between July 2022 and mid-2024, more than 136,000 land titles covering about 164,000 hectares were distributed to farmer-beneficiaries.

By late 2024, DAR reported over 200,000 titles issued nationwide, with the President vowing to complete the decades-old agrarian reform program by 2028.

Parcelization, e-titling, and debt condonation measures were announced, although farmer advocates argued that titles alone did not guarantee viable livelihoods without irrigation, credit, and marketing support.

Financing programs were rolled out under the Department of Agriculture (DA). In September 2024, the government launched Agri-Puhunan, later expanded to Agri-Puhunan at Pantawid (APP), designed to give cooperatives and rice producers low-cost credit and input access.

The DA targeted 1.2-million hectares for support, with pilots in major irrigation systems and new launches in Mindanao. While such schemes promised relief from predatory lending, their long-term effectiveness would depend on loan repayment structures, the timely release of inputs, and functional market linkages.

Market interventions

The budget picture offered another perspective. For 2023, the administration allocated around P43 billion for agriculture programs, according to the Department of Budget and Management.

The National Irrigation Administration highlighted that nearly a million hectares still lacked irrigation—a barrier to rice productivity—and pledged to fast-track projects under the Marcos administration. Yet many irrigation facilities remain unfinished, leaving farmers dependent on rainfall or costly pump systems.

Market interventions have been more visible to consumers. During periods of rice price surges, the National Food Authority released buffer stocks to local governments and expanded sales through Kadiwa outlets.

In February 2025, the government declared a food security emergency in rice, directing monthly NFA stock releases of about 25,000 metric tons. These interventions were meant to bring down retail prices, though their sustainability was questioned given the limited buffer stock.

Perhaps the most consequential policy shift came through Executive Order No. 62, signed in June 2024, which cut rice tariffs from 35 percent to 15 percent for a set period.

Officials framed the tariff reduction as necessary to temper inflation, but critics said it risked depressing farmgate prices and undermining local producers already struggling with high input costs. Economists noted the trade-off between consumer relief and farmer protection remained unresolved.

Observers also pointed to Marcos’s dual role as both President and agriculture secretary in the first half of his term. Supporters argued it showed he was serious about fixing systemic problems, while detractors saw it as overreach that left the department without full-time leadership. In November 2023, Marcos finally named a full-time agriculture secretary, but by then the policy direction had been firmly set by the Palace.

Land distribution

The cumulative record suggests a presidency that has not ignored agriculture—land titles have been handed out at a record pace, new credit programs exist, and market interventions have been frequent.

But results remain uneven. The promise of completing agrarian reform by 2028 is ambitious, given decades of delays. Agri-Puhunan and APP are still in their early phases, and questions remain about whether credit access will reach the most marginalized smallholders.

Irrigation and infrastructure gaps continue to hamper productivity, while tariff policies leave the sector vulnerable to external shocks.

“Title distribution and credit announcements are one thing, but productivity gains require irrigation, mechanization, and stable procurement,” said one policy analyst familiar with agrarian issues. “Without these, farmers will struggle even if they hold titles or loans.”

For consumers, rice prices remain a sensitive benchmark of government performance. Tariff cuts and NFA stock releases may offer temporary relief but they risk eroding farmers’ incomes if not matched by stronger domestic support. As global grain markets stay volatile, the Philippines’ reliance on imports remains a vulnerability.

Marcos entered office promising to fix agriculture by taking on the portfolio himself. Three years later, the picture is mixed: ambitious in scope, significant in numbers, but still short of transformative change.