Near nuke disaster of a 9-megaton ICBM

Historical Overview:

During the Cold War, the US built a complex array of ICBMs (Intercontinental Ballistic Missile) in response to the Russian threat to build their own ICBMs, in response to the US threat. Once the bombs were dropped in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in WW2, it became a vicious cycle — threat for threat.

Ironically, the spread of nuclear missiles started with threats, escalating exponentially to the high heavens. When the enemy built 100 nuclear missiles, 200 were built in response. Today, we have reached the point of overkill where the thousands of multiple warheads worldwide can decimate humankind perhaps 50 to 100 times over.

FEAR OF THE ENEMY was the initial escalating factor, a defensive survival reflex. This later evolved to CONQUEST OF THE ENEMY because of the logic that the best defense is offense. Thus, the rationale for the nuclear “first strike” was born. Generals and warriors on both sides thought there was really a wide overlap of defense and offense.

The Arkansas Event:

(Author’s note. This report is based on a video produced by Dark Records, which presumably had access to investigation documents.)

In September 1980, a few miles from Damascus in Arkansas, a mini-mushroom cloud explosion rocked the silo of a 9-megaton ICBM. The fuel that leaked from the second stage of the rocket exploded. It was theorized that a spark from the ventilation fan triggered the explosion.

The warhead was hurled 100 meters away but luckily did not explode. If it did explode, it would have been the equivalent of a giant “dirty bomb” scattering five megatons of radioactive material far and wide. A nuclear detonation requires a specific technical fission mechanism. (Note: The more complex fusion bomb would be developed much later.)

The “accident” was triggered ironically by a regular silo inspection as part of safety protocols. It was the use of a wrong wrench that triggered the eventual closure of the $10.5-million silo. One of the two inspectors who entered the 10-foot diameter, 150-foot deep silo used a ratchet wrench instead of a torque wrench.

As a result, he dropped the wrench socket down the silo, which ruptured the fuel shell of stage 2 of the rocket. The fuel leaked at once. The inspector admitted later that he realized he had the wrong wrench, but deemed it too late as they were already in safety suits inside the silo.

This was the human error behind the Arkansas tragedy, a very “small” error of thinking that it was all right. The base was ordered evacuated at once, including civilians in the neighboring areas.

One person was buried in the rubble and died later in the hospital, while 21 others were injured. Six medals for heroism were awarded to members of the rescue effort.

The ICBM complexes in three states were not abandoned but rendered obsolete later, replaced by more advanced models.

Lesson:

The accident was caused ironically by safety procedures. A small human error in a setting of a weapon of mass destruction caused the risk to human lives on a grand scale.

No amount of safety precautions can ensure total safety in any complex setting, whether ICBM or otherwise. Somewhere, sometime, somehow things can happen. The quick response to contain the tragedy was commended for saving lives in Arkansas. Quick response protocols should be rehearsed regularly in such a complex setting. This was the lesson learned.