When unlawful detainer is not proper

Here is an interesting case of unlawful detainer which all of us, especially my colleagues in the profession, should take careful note of.

The complainant owned a parcel of land. At some point, without her knowledge or consent, the defendants erected a structure on her property. Upon discovery, she ordered them to vacate. The defendants, however, convinced her to sell the property to them for a certain sum. As a show of good faith, they initially gave her a down payment. Complainant agreed and thus allowed them to stay in the property.

Later, complainant required them to enter into a contract with her. Defendants refused. Not wanting to sign, complainant filed a case of unlawful detainer. It was hinged on the fact that possession was allowed by plaintiff until it became illegal when defendants refused to comply with what was incumbent upon them.

The trial court rendered judgment against the defendants. On appeals, the complainant was constantly sustained. The case finally reached the Supreme Court. The issue to be threshed out, as advocated by the defendants, was whether a case for forcible entry, and not unlawful detainer, should have been filed.

Defendants posited so because their possession from the very start was neither sanctioned nor lawful. While the parties entered into a contract to sell the property, such did not cure the fact that possession was illegal from inception.

Thus ruled the Supreme Court: “There have been many cases discussing the distinction between actions for unlawful detainer and those for forcible entry. However, the common thread has always been the Court’s consistent adoption of the following precept — the border between forcible entry and unlawful detainer is defined by the nature of the defendant’s entry into or initial possession of the property.

“If the entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed against the intruder is forcible entry. If, however, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter becomes illegal, the case is unlawful detainer. This robust principle is so well established that it remains true even if the owner later decides to tolerate the intruder’s possession.

“As has been repeatedly avowed, such subsequent tolerance cannot convert an action for forcible entry into one for unlawful detainer. The rationale behind this rule is simple, yet compelling. To hold otherwise would grant imprescriptibility to actions for forcible entry, allowing them to be filed beyond the one-year prescriptive period by merely invoking subsequent tolerance.

“In the case at bench, Trinidad herself disavowed any knowledge of the incidents surrounding Pagarao’s and Caballa’s initial entry to the subject realty. In her complaint, she admitted that she does not know exactly when and by what manner or reason [Pagarao and Caballa] had occupied her lot. Short of an explicit declaration to that effect, Pagarao’s and Caballa’s entry was neither permitted nor tolerated by Trinidad. Needless to say, such admission runs counter to the requirement in an unlawful detainer case that tolerance should have been present from the very start of possession.

“Parenthetically, the Court cannot sustain the decision of the courts a quo to [from which] grant Trinidad’s complaint on the erroneous premise that Pagarao’s and Caballa’s initial unlawful possession ripened into a legal one upon reaching an agreement with her for the purchase of the disputed lot.

“Guided by the foregoing considerations, the parties’ agreement to enter into a contract to sell, by itself, did not alter the nature of Pagarao’s and Cabana’s possession of the subject property—one that was initially unlawful but subsequently tolerated.

“That being said, the tolerance later extended by Trinidad cannot, in effect, afford her the remedy of an unlawful detainer. The appropriate course of action is still, distinctly, one for forcible entry.”

The facts and redacted quoted portion of the decision are from Noe R. Pagarao Jr. et al. v. Immaculada T. Trinidad (G.R. No. 265223, 13 November 2024)