SCUTTLEBUTT

Children can’t sue parents

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ Commission on Bar Discipline, emphasizing the family as society’s core unit and the biblical commandment for mutual respect within families, ruled that children cannot sue their parents, nor can parents sue their children.

The IBP recommended suspending lawyers Howard Calleja, Ryan Aaron Uy, and Chantal Sue Paler from practicing law and fining each P35,000 for violating Sections 5 and 6, Canon II of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability (CPRA).

The IBP recommended a one-year suspension for Calleja and six-month suspensions for his associates, Uy and Paler, from practicing law, along with a P35,000 fine each for violating Sections 5 and 6, Canon II of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability (CPRA). These recommendations await Supreme Court approval.

The lawyers are associated with the Calleja Law Office, a civil, criminal, corporate, and constitutional law firm.

In the IBP ruling, the lawyers were found to have used harassing tactics by assisting their client in filing successive complaint-affidavits for qualified theft against a prominent individual despite the charge being inapplicable under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and a prior prosecutorial dismissal.

Calleja had a prior two-year suspension in 2013 for misappropriating client funds.

The IBP found the three lawyers’ actions to be a form of harassment and indicative of unfitness to practice law, violating the CPRA.

The lawyers were found to have filed successive complaint affidavits for qualified theft despite Article 332 of the RPC, which exempts certain relatives (e.g., spouses, ascendants, descendants, or siblings) from criminal liability for theft, swindling, or malicious mischief.

IBP, the mandatory bar association for Filipino lawyers, underlined the law’s provision that children can’t sue their parents.

The IBP noted that qualified theft was explicitly excluded from this exemption, but the lawyers’ persistence in filing the complaints after an initial prosecutorial dismissal suggested harassment.

Prosecutors dismissed the first complaint for qualified theft, indicating its lack of merit. The second filing lacked clear justification, reinforcing the IBP’s view of harassment.

The IBP concluded that the lawyers’ actions adversely reflected their fitness to practice law, discrediting the legal profession. This was deemed a violation of Sections 5 and 6, Canon II (Propriety) of the CPRA, which mandates lawyers to act with propriety and maintain professional integrity.

The case was initially filed under the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), but the IBP applied the CPRA, which repealed the CPR and has retroactive application to pending cases.

Section 32 of the CPRA requires the complainant to prove the allegations with substantial evidence, defined as evidence a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.

The complainant met this burden by demonstrating the harassing nature of the successive filings.

IBP stated Section 37(b), Canon VI, CPRA: Filing frivolous or baseless actions, especially after a dismissal, is a less serious offense, warranting suspension from practice for one to six months or a fine of P35,000 to P100,000.

The suspension from the practice of law for each lawyer reflected their lack of remorse.

The IBP emphasized the high moral standards required of lawyers, noting that the respondents’ conduct fell short of these expectations.

At the same time, the IBP ruling issued a stern warning and to quote, “that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.”