American intentions

Reassuring Asian allies that Trump won’t abandon them unlike the European allies was the initial point of scandal-prone US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s visit to the country and Japan.

While such assurance assuages somewhat our fears about the US defense commitment, it emphasizes that the US-China geopolitical competition remains the defining issue in international politics.

Such emphasis indicates the Trump administration is merely reasserting that US vital interests lie in preventing China from gaining “untrammeled regional hegemony in Asia.”

Hegseth’s Asian tour also means Trump is actively rallying “a counterbalancing (Asian) coalition to any Chinese bid for political and military supremacy in Asia,” much as the previous Biden administration did.

This much was clear when Hegseth told his Filipino hosts a “credible deterrence is necessary around the world, but specifically in this region, in your country, considering the threats from the communist Chinese.”

Hegseth backed his claim with a pledge the US would deploy additional advanced capabilities to the country, including the NMESIS anti-ship missile system.

China so far hasn’t commented on US plans to deploy and conduct operational tests of the stealthy NMESIS missile system in the forthcoming Balikatan exercises.

But China will surely object as she did over last year’s deployment of the more lethal Typhon missile system, which the country is considering buying.

Anyway, it is no less interesting that the Trump administration is now conscious of the broad American consensus that shoring up our and Japan’s self-defense capabilities should be a US priority.

Even more interesting is that the Trump administration is also noting emerging American views that the balance of power in Asia does not hinge on China seizing Taiwan.

Essentially, the view is that China faces limited military gains in seizing Taiwan and would hardly overturn the military balance in the region if it did so.

Seizing Taiwan, in short, isn’t enough to turn China into a hegemon as many fear.

On this, American academics Jennifer Kavanagh and Stephen Werthiem in a recent Foreign Affairs magazine piece insist that instead of Taiwan,“more important are the United States’ ties to the major economic and military centers Japan, India, and, to a lesser degree, South Korea, Indonesia and the Philippines.”

But, “over the past few years, US efforts to strengthen allied militaries have emphasized Taiwan-related scenarios, leading the US to pay “insufficient attention to its allies’ most immediate security requirements.”

Such shouldn’t be the case, however. “Despite the fears of some in Tokyo and Manila, China would still face formidable obstacles in seizing outlying territories belonging to Japan or the Philippines” if China took Taiwan, argue Kavanagh and Wortheim.

Nonetheless, both say “countries threatened by China’s rise have to invest in security measures no matter what happens in and around Taiwan,” including presumably searching for other allies besides the US.

Still, if it’s the case that US officials now see that China is unable to dramatically expand regionally, we nonetheless should urgently prepare for any eventuality.

Hegseth, meanwhile, claims the US isn’t seeking war in the region and insists that transactional and isolationist Trump is a “peacemaker.”

While Hegseth’s pronouncements ring hollow to Chinese officials, his claim is in line with American views that if the US wants to gain the upper hand, US officials must make it clear a regional war isn’t in the cards.

This not only because many Asian countries, including us, are leery of getting pulled into a US conflict with China but also because there are grave economic and military costs to a US-China shooting war.