Some political pundits opine that the political events unfolding before our eyes resemble a chess battle between the Marcos administration and former President Rodrigo Duterte. In many ways, they do.

Duterte can be characterized as a player with bravado and confidence, who has always viewed President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. as a weak and indecisive opponent.

Duterte’s aggressive gambit can be considered, in chess parlance, a “king’s pawn push,” daring PBBM to engage directly. He has continuously taunted the Marcos administration, relying heavily on his audacity and intimidation. Even during his recent trip to Hong Kong, he publicly challenged the administration’s resolve with rhetoric like, “Go ahead, ICC, arrest me.”

Perhaps the former president was confident that PBBM would hesitate, fearing a political backlash or becoming embroiled in a legal stalemate over sovereignty. This bluff relied on the assumption that PBBM would fold under pressure, thereby preserving Duterte’s image as tough and untouchable.

However, PBBM counterattacked and decisively called Duterte’s bluff. Duterte’s arrest and subsequent handover to the International Criminal Court (ICC), as a chess-aficionado friend of mine described it, was akin to “castling” followed by “queen to f7 check.”

Castling here represents PBBM securing his position — complying with Interpol’s red notice rather than the ICC directly — thus shielding his administration from accusations of bowing to a foreign court. The “queen to f7” move was the handover itself, a striking maneuver that put Duterte in immediate jeopardy.

By surrendering Duterte to The Hague, PBBM called his bluff, betting that the ICC’s justices would vote to proceed, effectively removing Duterte from the local political chessboard.

In chess terms, this counterattack can also be likened to a “pin” — a calculated play that exploits Duterte’s overextension while shifting the game’s momentum. This is not to be considered a checkmate yet, but the “pin” forces Duterte into a defensive posture. Now in detention, Duterte is pinned — his fate lies with the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber I.

A quick look at the composition of Chamber I — three liberal-leaning female justices (Romanian Iulia Motoc, Polish Joanna Korner and Hungarian Reine Alapini-Gansou) and two conservative male justices (Peruvian Luz del Carmen Ibáñez Carranza and Japanese Tomoko Akane) — suggests a likely 3-2 split in favor of advancing the case to trial.

Motoc, a renowned human rights scholar, and Korner, a seasoned war crimes prosecutor, have consistently championed accountability for mass atrocities. Alapini-Gansou’s focus on victim rights further tilts the scales toward accountability. In contrast, Ibáñez Carranza and Akane, though rigorous in their jurisprudence, tend to prioritize procedural restraint.

Given the gravity of the charges — murder as a crime against humanity, stemming from over 6,000 documented deaths during Duterte’s brutal drug war — the liberal bloc is poised to outmaneuver and outvote their conservative counterparts, setting the stage for Duterte’s historic trial.

From a global perspective, this is also a trial of the ICC itself — a litmus test of its relevance and legitimacy. Will it push back against the rising tide of conservative and populist resistance? In other words, on this chessboard, Duterte is no longer the king but merely a pawn in a larger contest between liberal internationalism and nationalist politics.

On the domestic front, Duterte’s camp is attempting a counterplay, seeking to turn his arrest into a rallying cry for sympathy and political resurgence. Vice President Sara Duterte has framed the arrest as a betrayal and a surrender of sovereignty, claiming it will galvanize their PDP-Laban slate to a senatorial sweep in the May 2025 midterms. However, this move feels like a desperate pawn shuffle. Sara herself is embroiled in an impeachment trial, facing accusations of unlawful wealth and misusing public funds, among others. A conviction would effectively end her political career.

Moreover, the Dutertes’ ability to mobilize “people power” — a traditional weapon in Philippine realpolitik — is severely compromised. The former president has long lost military sympathy following the murder of General Wesley Barayuga by his drug war architects.

Although Duterte’s direct involvement remains in question, from the military’s perspective, the drug war was the cause of the cause of the evil caused (Causa causarum malum causatum). Additionally, Duterte’s dwindling resources and increasing difficulty in controlling the narrative have led to the erosion of his political support base.

In sum, we now know that PBBM is not a weak opponent. On the contrary, he moves with restraint and precision. PBBM’s counterattack called Duterte’s bluff and redefined the political chess game, leaving the former president scrambling for an escape that may no longer be possible.