A bristling China has predictably condemned the just-enacted Philippine Maritime Zones Act and the Philippine Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act, with China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoning Philippine Ambassador to Beijing, Jaime FlorCruz, in “serious protest” of President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr.’s inking of the two measures into law last Friday, 14 November.

The two laws define Philippine maritime zones and archipelagic sea lanes and air routes, asserting the country’s rights over its territorial waters, particularly the West Philippine Sea.

According to the President, his signing into law of the measures maintain the primacy of UNCLOS and the 2016 Arbitral Award, both of which reaffirm the Philippines’ “sovereign rights and jurisdiction in our waters,” projecting to the international community the government’s staunch commitment to nurture, cultivate and protect “our maritime domain.”

Such words raised China’s blood pressure, with Beijing trouncing the move as an attempt by the Philippine government to solidify the “illegal ruling” of the South China Sea arbitration case through domestic legislation.

China insists the maritime zones law “illegally” includes most of what it calls Huangyan Island (Panatag or Scarborough Shoal) and Nansha (Spratlys) Island, both of which China continues to claim as its own.

This despite the unanimous Arbitral Tribunal (constituted under the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention) ruling rejecting China’s expansive South China Sea territorial and maritime claims based on international law, in favor of the Philippines.

This latest development is certain to re-intensify tensions between the Philippines and China, with no assurances this time that the US, under Donald Trump, would readily come to support its Mutual Defense Treaty ally.

Trump has been re-elected US President with his well-known multilateral skepticism and his America First doctrine promising to re-fashion US foreign policy.

To recall, during Trump’s first term in the White House, there was a perception that the US was ambivalent about the US-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951 which binds the US and the Philippines to come to each other’s aid if either is attacked.

Then Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana ordered the MDT reviewed. After Biden defeated Trump in 2020, the US made more categorical assurances about abiding by the MDT’s armed attack provision.

But now Trump, with his avowed America First policy, is back in power and there is no assurance that he would be as involved as Biden was where Philippine geopolitical issues, particularly against the Chinese in the West Philippine Sea, are concerned.

A critical question, in fact, that the Philippine government should seriously ponder is whether Trump would be willing not only to maintain US support for the Philippines against China, but also manifest the same level of commitment to the Philippines in terms of economic benefits, as staunchly expressed under Biden.

For instance, what would happen now to the $1-billion worth of “recently completed or anticipated US investments” touted by US Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo during the Presidential Trade and Investment Mission to the Philippines that she led in March 2024?

Or the US and Japan-backed Luzon Economic Corridor (LEC) which had been committed as part of the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI) that came out of the Trilateral Summit between the US, Japan, and the Philippines hosted by President Biden in Washington, D.C. in April, 2024.

That trilateral commitment is expected to accelerate investments in high-impact infrastructure projects such as rail, port modernization, clean energy and semiconductor supply chains and deployments, agribusiness, and civilian port upgrades at Subic Bay.

The LEC, envisioned as a hub for commerce, industry and logistics, is seen to spark economic growth and regional development through key urban and industrial zones, including Metro Manila, Batangas and Central Luzon.

An estimated $100 billion in US (and Japanese) investments are expected to be generated by the LEC over the next decade.

Will a second Trump presidency commit, at least, the US’s share in this endeavor?

It’s all up in the air, and until Trump ascends to the throne in January 2025, everything, including the ties binding the US to the Philippines in the next four years, remains in the realm of speculation.