This Court finds that the foregoing requirements were not complied with when petitioner resorted to summons by publication.

The Process Server’s Report indicates that only two attempts were made to personally serve respondent with summons at the address provided. The process server’s first attempt failed as respondent was not there, and the process server was advised by the security guard on duty to return another day as respondent would visit occasionally. When the process server returned more than two weeks later, respondent was, again, not at the address. However, the security guard disclosed that respondent was currently living in Antipolo City.

Contrary to petitioner’s assertions that earnest efforts were made, the foregoing report of the actions undertaken by the process server shows the inadequacy of the attempts to personally serve summons upon respondent. The security guard with whom the process server spoke revealed that respondent would frequent the house and even divulged the city where respondent resides. These pieces of information were vital details that would have likely led to respondent and to the success of personal service of summons upon him.

If the process server had only exercised his duty zealously, then summons would have been personally served upon respondent and his due process rights would be protected in the proceedings. In this light, it cannot be concluded that personal service was impossible or could not be made within a reasonable time.

Petitioner’s reliance on Macasaet to justify the process server’s attempts is likewise misplaced. The sheriff in that case had deemed it futile to attempt a third time to personally serve summons after he was informed, during his second attempt, that there was no likelihood of respondent’s return.

As such, substituted service of summons was resorted to, which the Court upheld.

The facts in Macasaet deviate from this case in that respondent here would still frequent the address indicated in the summons and the process server was informed of the city where he resides. A third attempt at either the given address or further investigation into the lead of respondent’s residence would have likely proven a success. Further, the petitioner in Macasaet resorted to substituted service, which petitioner in this case failed to undertake.

Even assuming that the attempts made to personally serve summons upon respondent met the necessary threshold, petitioner’s immediate resort to service of summons through publication instead of substituted summons violates the diligence requirement.

Petitioner did not explain why substituted service was not attempted. The Process Server’s Report is bereft of any statement regarding whether substituted service was availed of or any explanation as to why such mode would be infeasible. Petitioner’s statement that “despite diligent inquiries and efforts exerted by the petitioner to determine the address and whereabouts of the respondent in Antipolo City for the purpose of serving the summons, such efforts were unavailing[,] for the reasons earlier discussed, does not persuade.

As such, the process server cannot be said to have exerted diligent efforts to locate respondent and that personal service of summons, including substituted service, was impossible. Petitioner’s immediate resort to service by publication, therefore, cannot be upheld.

Petitioner’s act of immediately asking for leave of court to effect service through publication, instead of chasing down the lead regarding respondent’s current address or availing of substituted service of summons, reveals her deliberate intent to bypass respondent’s due process rights and keep him in the dark regarding the petition to annul their marriage. The Regional Trial Court should have been more circumspect in its duty to determine whether alternate modes of service of summons could have been availed of.

As the service of summons by publication upon respondent deviated from the rigid requirements imposed by the Court, the Regional Trial Court failed to acquire jurisdiction over his person and failed to protect his due process rights. Therefore, the resultant proceedings and the decision rendered therein are null and void and cannot be binding upon him.

See how important the faithful observance of the process of serving this summons? It is not a mere ordinary act of notification. The irregularity may mean a victory short-lived for the complainant, who in the end will have nothing to celebrate, after going through the long process of litigation.

The facts and quoted provision of the decision are from Kristine Calubaquib-Diaz v. Dino Lopez Diaz, G.R. 235033, 12 October 2022.