There’s a “road less traveled” that may address the impasse that has placed Beijing and Manila in a constant state of conflict over disputed territorial waters. Vietnam’s “hedging strategy” over the South China Sea might serve as a template for the Philippines to gain a comparative advantage.

In a recent paper in the Naval War College Review (Winter 2024), Jeff Zeberlein of the United States Navy discussed Vietnam’s “four nos” as influenced precisely by China’s actions over maritime claims. The tack the Marcos administration has chosen is the opposite of what Vietnam has done to tilt the balance of US versus China regional hegemony.

It appears the US and Vietnam have upgraded their diplomatic relationship to a “comprehensive strategic partnership” at par with the “highest level of partnership” that Vietnam bestows upon China. There’s time left for our Department of National Defense to navigate a policy shift and do a Vietnam.

What could be replicated is how Vietnam forswore: 1) military alliances; 2) foreign military basing agreements; and 3) power balancing accomplished by partnering with one country to act against another. Denouncing the use or threat of violence in international relations as a fourth “no” completes the agenda.

We might be better off if the Philippines “resets” current policies to mimic Vietnam’s “four nos” policy. Sadly, our country has formed military alliances with countries that are essentially US allies; it is hosting US bases on Philippine soil through the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA); it uses the US as a counter-balance to China; and it demonstrates ambiguity in denouncing the use or threat of violence in international relations.

The “four yeses” rather than the “four nos” may be considered “categorical errors” the government has unfortunately fallen into. The beauty of Vietnam’s hedging strategy (euphemism for “cooperating and struggling”) is that its defense policy is primarily geared toward China while its “four nos” serve as a means of maintaining strategic autonomy from the United States.

If no one in our officialdom can see the brighter prospects of the Vietnam model, then it reduces realpolitik to Plato’s Allegory of the Cave. In the case of Vietnam, these “four nos” are actually policy milestones, each embodied in four distinct White Papers — something the Philippines has failed to even consider.

It might be important to write one such White Paper that spells out our foreign policy in either a clear or even ambiguous fashion. For example, a “policy of strategic ambiguity,” as one expert refers to it, is far better than a much too clear “military approach” in collaboration with the US.

The former means that an “ambiguous foreign policy allows the country to balance its relationship with China and the United States.” Policymakers have utterly failed to realize that escalating tensions over the disputed waters between China and the Philippines could lead to a delicate mathematical solution on how much we can leverage and how much we can compromise.

It’s like finding the perfect equilibrium in order to see that a strategic and diplomatic tack on one end of the scale would equal the other end of the scale. The Philippines is akin to a fulcrum that could either be skewed toward favoring China over US hegemony and vice versa.

The country should study the case of Vietnam which has the wherewithal to achieve the best of both worlds. Can the Philippines forswear: a) military alliances; b) foreign military basing agreements; c) partnering with one country to act against another; and d) the use or threat of violence in international relations?

Our leaders chose to be the “poster boy” for US interests rather than navigate toward China’s emerging regional growth, forthwith tilting the balance toward Western hegemony over the Eastern hemisphere. China’s strategy is driven and framed by its own history, culture and legal infrastructure (i.e., China Coast Guard law).

Just how well can we modify entirely our “four yeses” into “four nos” and do a Vietnam?