Since it was inevitable, calmly reacting to the pullout of the beleaguered BRP Teresa Magbanua from Escoda Shoal is the correct and proper posture.

Security experts, in fact, have long known that China’s aggressive gray zone tactics are to deliberately maim Filipino ships in order to force them to steam home for repairs.

Chinese blockades of Filipino ships patrolling the West Philippine Sea (WPS) and denying supplies to these ships is also meant to force pullouts.

Hardly surprising then is the pullout of the damaged and supplies-deprived Magbanua from its five-month deployment at Escoda Shoal.

The 97-meter Magbanua, one of the Philippine Coast Guard’s (PCG) biggest and most modern ships, left the shoal amid bad weather last week for repairs after it was rammed recently by a China Coast Guard (CCG) vessel.

The ship also had to bring home some sick crewmen, largely because the Magbanua’s crew were forced to subsist on “lugaw” (rice porridge) and rainwater for nearly three weeks after supply boats failed to break through the swarms of Chinese ships.

While the Magbanua’s pullout means the country presently has no physical presence in and around Escoda — making it appear that China has de facto control of the shoal — most security experts caution that “short-term knee jerk” reactions to the pullout are misplaced.

Ray Powell, director of SeaLight, a maritime transparency initiative of the Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation at Stanford University, for instance, says Manila shouldn’t fret but instead prepare for a “longer game” with China.

“The Philippines will need to play a longer game, recognizing that Escoda itself is not a primary objective of this long struggle. This is a contest over maritime sovereignty… and while China’s current control of Escoda Shoal may seem like a setback, it is a more symbolic than strategic objective,” Powell told a newspaper.

Military officials, meanwhile, gave assurances that the Magbanua’s absence from the shoal is being compensated for.

Rear Adm. Roy Vincent Trinidad, for example, insists “presence is not only defined as physical presence. There are a range of different capabilities that are sea-based, air-based, or space-based that we are developing in conjunction with our partners and allies to be able to monitor not only Escoda but the entire West Philippine Sea.”

Despite these qualifications, however, maintaining a presence at Escoda and elsewhere in the WPS is nonetheless crucial. A fact that is not lost on the government when it announced the deployment of another PCG vessel to Escoda — which gained flashpoint status following suspicions China was about to reclaim it.

While details of this new deployment remain sketchy, experts strongly suggest that government in the meantime re-think how it manages missions to avoid another Magbanua incident.

Former Supreme Court Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio, for example, says government should now accept the US offer to escort Filipino resupply ships.

Carpio was referring to US Indo-Pacific Command Adm. Samuel Paparo Jr.’s recent statement that US ships escorting resupply missions is “an entirely reasonable option within our Mutual Defense Treaty.”

While the military establishment remains lukewarm to the idea of calling on the US for help, security experts say the option begs serious consideration as it means, as one expert says, “transitioning from sporadic ‘show the flag’ patrols, to more sustained multiple area joint patrols with the US and other partners.”

Other than that option, re-thinking also means security and military officials can seek out new local options, short of going on a war footing, to combat China’s sophisticated maritime paramilitary campaign in the WPS.

Retired Rear Admiral Rommel Jude Ong, for instance, advocates for a reconfiguration of the Navy’s base in Subic to support multinational maritime patrols.

The PCG and Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources should also consider leasing and reflagging at least two large oil tankers and slightly modifying them into floating bases to support their operations in the WPS, Ong suggests.

Security officials should seriously consider these options, as well as many others, if they are to effectively combat China’s asymmetric gray zone warfare.