Graft hive

A golden age of infrastructure was started during the term of President Rodrigo Duterte in what was billed as the “Build, Build, Build” (BBB) program that required the government to allot P1.5 trillion a year for infrastructure.

Contracts with the private sector filled the massive catch-up effort of the country after the massive underspending during the Aquino administration.

Due to the lack of an infrastructure program, the Philippines, when Duterte took over, was among the laggards in economic development in the region that was experiencing robust progress.

A list of flagship projects was rolled out, along with smaller contracts to spread out the pump priming to the whole country.

The Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) spearheaded the buildup.

Under Public Works Secretary Mark Villar, who is now a senator, 44,000 civil works contracts were signed in the first two years of the BBB, according to DPWH figures.

To put the number in context, it was nearly twice the number of deals entered into from 2000 to 2008 under President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. It was equivalent to nearly 2,000 projects awarded monthly for roads, bridges, schools, flood-control systems, and water systems.

The BBB’s collateral goal was to stimulate the economy through the creation of new jobs with the new projects, the biggest of which notably employed a great number of expatriates mainly from China.

Crucial to the massive rollout of the projects was the public confidence that Duterte gained with his pledge that his administration would not allow corrupt practices in the raft of contracts signed.

The so-called “standard operating procedure” (SOP) among officials and contractors, however, persisted.

Under the SOP, local and DPWH officials collude with favored contractors through a Mafia-like setup which makes graft a given during the public auction for projects.

Legitimate builders who looked forward to getting a crack at the government projects then sought the crafting of “measures to insulate and isolate infrastructure projects from the political intervention that had become syndicated.”

The call fell on deaf ears and the tight circle of those who benefited from the rigged biddings remained intact, according to a frequent participant in DPWH biddings. He said the sheer enormity of the projects multiplied the chances for fat kickbacks.

Most of the projects were subpar because the contractors were focused on how to apportion the grease money among the waiting officials.

Projects auctioned off to take advantage of the dry season ended up being delayed, thus the spectacle of most of the projects lying idle during the onset of the wet season.

With too many projects on their hands, the firms involved in the Mafia went into subcontracting which was made to appear as part of the joint venture agreements. Subcontractors used the licenses of the contract holders in exchange for up to a five-percent fee computed on the total project cost.

The result was sloppy rushed projects, which were meant only to collect the contract cost.

It is easy to imagine public money being wasted and pocketed through the years through such ingrained graft in government agencies.

Massive flooding throughout the country would have been greatly reduced had the P200 billion or so in the yearly budget just for such purpose been put into worthy projects.

Creating infrastructure is vital in development and in saving lives, instead of for lining the pockets of the corrupt officials in government.