In the previous article, we discussed Republic Act 7309, the law that created the Department of Justice-Board of Claims (DoJ-BoC) to administer compensation for victims of unjust imprisonment or detention and victims of violent crimes.

In this article, we discuss the case of Mohammad v. Office of the Secretary et al. (G.R. 256116, 27 February 2024) where the Supreme Court En Banc clarified the elements for claiming compensation by an applicant under Section 3(a) of RA 7309.

To recall, under Section 3 of RA 7309 those qualified to claim compensation include:

a. A person who was unjustly accused, convicted, and imprisoned, and subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal;

b. A person who was unjustly detained and released without being charged;

c. A person who was a victim of arbitrary detention by the authorities as defined in the Revised Penal Code under a final judgment of the court; or

d. A person who was a victim of a violent crime which includes rape and offenses committed with malice that resulted in death or serious physical and/or psychological injuries, permanent incapacity or disability, insanity, abortion, serious trauma, or committed with torture, cruelty or barbarity.

In the decision penned by Associate Justice Maria Filomena Singh, and published on 12 July 2024, the Supreme Court En Banc upheld the DoJ-BoC’s denial of the compensation claim of a certain Main Mohammad.

In 2017, Mohammad was arrested, detained, and charged with piracy and two counts of murder after being identified as a member of the Abu Sayyaf Group. However, in 2019, the charges were dismissed after the prosecution failed to produce a witness who could identify Mohammad as the same person charged in the information.

Mohammad then filed a compensation claim before the DoJ-BoC in Zamboanga City, invoking Section 3(a) of RA 7309, which allows compensation to be availed of by “a person who was unjustly accused, convicted, and imprisoned, and subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal.”

In filing his claim, Mohammad argued that the conjunction “and” in Section 3(a) should be construed as “or” to avoid injustice to persons unjustly prosecuted even though subsequently acquitted by the trial court.

The DoJ-BoC, however, denied his claim on the ground that, first, there must be a conviction in the trial court and, later, a release from detention because of an acquittal on appeal. In Mohammad’s case, he was released from detention upon acquittal only at the level of the trial court and not subsequently released from detention by virtue of an acquittal on appeal.

Aggrieved, Mohammad appealed to the Office of the Secretary.

The Justice Secretary affirmed the Board’s denial of Mohammad’s claim, which prompted him to file a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

The Supreme Court denied Mohammad’s petition and ruled that for an applicant to qualify for compensation under Section 3(a) of RA 7309, he/she must meet ALL elements:

1. There must be a person who was unjustly accused;

2. The person must have been convicted of the offense,

3. The person was imprisoned by virtue of that conviction, and

4. The person was subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal.

The High Court ruled that all the elements are cumulative rather than alternative since the conjunctive word “and” indicates the union of words or phrases.

In Mohammad’s case, the Supreme Court found that all the elements were lacking.

As to the first element, the Court found it lacking as no reason was given to show there was an unjust accusation other than the fact that Mohammad was detained for two years only to be acquitted. The High Court emphasized that the prosecutor’s finding of probable guilt, absent any bad faith, cannot be considered an unjust accusation, even if it leads to an acquittal of the accused.

As to the second element, the Court found it lacking as there was no conviction due to the dismissal of charges. Considering there was no conviction, it is logical that the last two elements are likewise absent.

The Supreme Court concluded that while it has been pursuing judicial reforms toward a fair and just society for all, regardless of race, religion, gender, and age, it cannot overstep its bounds and amend existing legislation to address any perceived injustice.

For more of Dean Nilo Divina’s legal tidbits, please visit www.divinalaw.com. For comments and questions, please send an email to cad@divinalaw.com.