War and Pieces

Whilst waiting for my turn to be interviewed via video-teleconferencing for a top-rated public affairs show, I had no choice but to listen to a supposedly Filipino military expert who was prattling on about how China could never win a war in the Pacific against the United States.

Spouting knowledge indubitably gained merely from Wikipedia, he discussed how the US had the more technologically advanced navy, and that in a conflict with China in the South China Sea or in relation to a Taiwanese invasion, “the US will not sail alone,” but will have the collective navies of Australia, South Korea, Japan and even India to count on, yada yada yada…

I could not help but shake my head slowly at the sheer shallowness of the analysis. It is obvious that it was heavily influenced, not by a profound study of geopolitics, but by repeatedly playing war games on a computer, where the equation in alliances is always all-or-nothing.

It could not be more different in the real world, where there are gradations in commitments notwithstanding treaty alliances, especially when it involves military hardware and troops. A war in the Pacific will be fought mainly by naval forces, so one must realize that military assets, especially ships, are very expensive and take a long time to fabricate (years, in fact).

Australia has less than 20 surface combat ships and a handful of submarines. South Korea has much more (80 plus combat ships) and a big submarine fleet, but that is because it is technically still at war with North Korea. Japan has two aircraft carriers and two helicopter carriers (that look suspiciously like aircraft carriers) and its navy is arguably the best in the region, qualitatively speaking.

But unlike in computer games, countries do not commit the whole, or even the bulk, of their forces to a war where there is no existential threat to their countries, meaning an actual invasion of their homeland. For the sake of treaty obligations, the aforementioned countries would probably send a few of their ships to the region as support forces for the Americans who will be expected to do the bulk of the fighting.

The United Kingdom and France — two of the United States’ staunchest allies in Europe — may even send in one carrier each, although these are small, light carriers. But South Korea has a real threat from across the DMZ, and from a nuclear-armed enemy yet, thus it will save the bulk of its armed forces for its defense. Australia has very few destroyers, and will probably deploy just its frigates. Japan, also in a dispute with China over some islands, may commit more of its forces, but it is not likely to be a big percentage in the absence of a threat to its four main islands, its mainland.

As for India — which our naïve analyst said is going to align itself with America — dream on. India will be reluctant to go to war against its almost equally populous neighbor, especially not a sea war, and especially not on behalf of America, because its territorial quarrel with China is over land, not islands. Besides, it is saving its strength for its ideological arch-nemesis Pakistan, which is also nuclear-capable, and which has been launching sporadic attacks over their common border.

In all this, the Philippines has made itself vulnerable in case of an out-and-out war. So far, the Chinese have not instigated an armed attack against our vessels in the West Philippine Sea so as not to trigger the Mutual Defense Treaty with the US. But once it is inevitable that the US will intervene anyway — say if Taiwan is invaded — then Chinese military planners would be stupid not to make a preemptive strike on the EDCA sites to deny their use to the Americans.

In a choice between war and peace, we had better hope that the latter prevails. Otherwise, in case of war, our country will be in pieces.