Britannica Dictionary defines “countermeasure” as an action or device intended to stop or prevent something bad or dangerous. The President burst out with an “unholy” statement on Twitter over Maundy Thursday that could be readily (mis)interpreted by keen observers of trends, not least by world leaders, about “countermeasures set against China” as the retaliatory response of an offended government.  

There have been antecedent events that prompted the President to issue such a post on X but it may have unwittingly pressed “alarm buttons” at the next turn that the China Coast Guard and Chinese Maritime Militia will sow tension in the country’s exclusive economic zone. 

Apparently, FM Jr. signed Executive Order (EO) 57 on 25 March 2024 titled, “Strengthening the Philippines’ Maritime Security and Maritime Domain Awareness,” as an instrument that patronizingly affirms commitment to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in furtherance of our sovereign rights and maritime jurisdiction.

It’s unfortunate that an ordinary reading of the text after the eleven “Whereases” (i.e. introductory statements) until that portion of “Now, therefore, I, … do hereby order:” — all that followed were fourteen “Sections.” Yet, no Section whatsoever even remotely spelled out what precisely the President’s order was any more than the “renaming, reorganizing, replacing of” already existing offices/councils/centers — if not invariably “what office will be attached to another or will be included as member of.”

No metrics, no benchmarks, no roadmaps, no order of battle to govern how the government will actually undertake the strengthening of maritime security much less of awareness of maritime domain. Even the sweeping definitions of what those concepts — “maritime security” and “maritime domain” — refer to have all the makings of an “obscurantist agenda.” To describe the six-page EO as surreal is not an understatement. 

It is worrisome how the President’s pronouncement will be operationalized if what triggered this official behavior was simply the 23 March water cannon attack alleged to have “damaged” a Philippine Navy supply boat and “wounded” three sailors headed to the BRP Sierra Madre. 

Does such an incident justifiably warrant a “recital” of whatever was contained in the President’s statement? A tad difficult to comprehend with crystal clarity if his “response and countermeasure package” didn’t imply a “clear and present danger.”

Only “worn out” dogmas are oft-repeated in the media-fueled anti-China narrative, namely: 1) Second Thomas Shoal or Ayungin Shoal lies within the country’s EEZ; 2) The Arbitral Award of 2016 (aka The Hague Ruling) favors the Philippine claim over the West Philippine Sea; 3) UNCLOS serves as a common ground in international law; 4) the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty between the US and the Philippines may be invoked.

There was a belated disclosure of an existing “gentleman’s agreement” of the status quo in the WPS, which means nothing beyond “rotation and resupply missions” are permissible.  After all the deprecating allegations of a bad China, how could arch public officials and commentators relieve themselves of such follies or faults even as the Pentagon weighs in with the expressed backing of a military ally?

Meanwhile, China is sticking to its parochial belief and is specifically “averse” to the government’s recourse of soliciting foreign support to protect and secure its sovereignty — a thing that the Chinese leadership considers  “treachery and provocation.” Beijing has consistently registered its opposition to foreign interference in this maritime dispute and cynics are starting to think that perhaps someone in the Pentagon is pulling the strings. 

All told, there’s a lesson to be learned from the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff wherein China engaged the Philippine in a “maritime brinkmanship game.” However, tell-tale signs indicate that Marcos will do an Aquino as the final balancing act against China’s realpolitik tactic. How safe would it be if the US and other major maritime powers enter the fray? 

There’s no debate when scholars describe the South China Sea as the “most complex and intractable of all disputed maritime spaces.” But will seeking protection under the US military umbrella in the strategic containment of China be a blessing or a curse?