Under principles of criminal law, the principals of a crime are those “who take a direct part in the execution of the act; those who directly force or induce others to commit it; [or] [t]hose who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been accomplished.”

There is a conspiracy “when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it”:

“Conspiracy is not presumed. Like the physical acts constituting the crime itself, the elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. While conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence, for it may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime, all taken together, however, the evidence must be strong enough to show the community of criminal design. For conspiracy to exist, it is essential that there must be a conscious design to commit an offense. Conspiracy is the product of intentionality on the part of the cohorts.

“It is necessary that a conspirator should have performed some overt act as a direct or indirect contribution to the execution of the crime committed. The overt act may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the commission of the crime or by exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators.

“The doctrine that a corporate officer’s criminal liability stems from his or her active participation in the commission of a wrongful act is consistent with the wording of P.D. 957. To recall, Section 39 thereof provides that in the case of a corporation, the “President, Manager or Administrator or the person who has charge of the administration of the business shall be criminally responsible” for a violation of P.D. 957. Thus, in assigning liability for crimes committed by a corporation, the law refers to the person in charge of the administration of the business — who may or may not be the President, Manager, or Administrator. What is crucial in ascertaining criminal liability is not the position of said officer, but his or her functions in relation to the specific violation he or she is charged with. In this case, the prosecution had the burden of showing that Valenzona was responsible for the registration of ALSGRO’s contracts in order to hold him liable under Section 17 of P.D. 957. However, it has been established that the specific obligation to comply with Section 17 was given to another department within ALSGRO, i.e., the Marketing, Documentations and Processing Department.

“Verily, the fact that the president is specifically made liable under P.D. 957 for violations made by a corporation does not excuse the prosecution from proving Valenzona’s active participation in the crime charged. Having the burden of proving the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to provide evidence showing that Valenzona’s duties and responsibilities as President entailed his active participation in ALSGRO’s non-registration of the subject contracts.

“However, what has been established is that the specific obligation to comply with Section 17 was given to another department, not the president. The evidence on record is bereft of any showing that Valenzona’s acts or omissions had caused ALSGRO to violate Section 17 of P.D. 957. Likewise, the prosecution failed to prove that it was within Valenzona’s power as President of ALSGRO to prevent such a violation. In the absence of proof that Valenzona had any direct and active participation in the non-registration of the subject contracts, he cannot be made criminally liable for violation of Section 17 of P.D. 957.”

The facts and quoted provision of the decision are from People of the Philippines v. Felix G. Valenzona (G.R. No. 248584, 30 August 2023).