Malum prohibitum: Intent to perpetrate the act (2)

That said, dispensing with proof of criminal intent for crimes mala prohibita does not, in any way, discharge the prosecution of its burden to show that the accused did the prohibited act intentionally.

On this note, it is important to distinguish between intent to commit the crime and plan to perpetrate the act.

While a person may not have consciously intended to commit a crime regarded as malum prohibitum, he or she may still be held liable if he or she did intend to commit an act that is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself. Thus, for mala prohibita acts, the intent to perpetrate the prohibited act under the special law must nevertheless be shown.

In contrast to crimes mala in se, which presuppose that the person who did the felonious act had criminal intent, crimes mala prohibita do not require such knowledge or criminal intent; rather, what is crucial is volition or the intent to commit the act. While volition or voluntariness refers to knowledge of the act being done (as opposed to knowledge of the nature of the act), criminal intent is the state of mind that goes beyond voluntariness, and it is this intent that is punished by crimes mala in se.

To hold an offender liable for a malum prohibitum offense, it is sufficient that there is a conscious intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law, for the essence of mala prohibita is voluntariness in the commission of the act constitutive of the crime.

Succinctly put, for crimes mala in se, there must be proof of criminal intent, while for crimes mala prohibita, it is sufficient that the prohibited act is done freely and consciously. As applied here, even if a violation of P.D. 957 is malum prohibitum, it must still be established that the accused had the volition or intent to commit the prohibited act, which is the non-registration of the subject contracts.

With these considerations in mind, a review of the records of the instant case shows that the evidence presented is insufficient to establish Valenzona's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. All that was established was that ALSGRO did not register the subject contracts and that Valenzona was the president of ALSGRO. However, as laid down in the preceding discussions, these premises are not enough. To hold Valenzona criminally liable, it must also be established that he had the volition or intent not to register or cause the non-registration of the subject contracts. This the prosecution miserably failed to do.

Relatedly, it should be emphasized that a corporation's personality is separate and distinct from its officers, directors, and shareholders. To be criminally liable for the acts of a corporation, there must be a showing that its officers, directors, and shareholders actively participated in or had the power to prevent the wrongful act.

Accordingly, Valenzona was correct to cite the case of ABS-CBN, which likewise involved a malum prohibitum crime (i.e., violation of the Intellectual Property Code) where the corporate officers were charged with criminal liability. Therein, the Court made the following pronouncements:

Corporations have separate and distinct personalities from their officers or directors. This court has ruled that corporate officers and/or agents may be held individually liable for a crime committed under the Intellectual Property Code.

Mere membership in the Board or being president per se does not mean knowledge, approval, and participation in the act alleged as criminal. There must be a showing of active participation, not simply a constructive one.                       

(To be continued)