EDITORIAL
CoC: Can it grow teeth under Singapore?
The Code may yet be concluded, but only when China decides it serves its interests, or when the cost of refusing exceeds the cost of agreeing.
Manila hands over the ASEAN chairmanship to Singapore with a Code of Conduct (CoC), the proposed legally binding framework being negotiated between ASEAN and China, which is 80 percent finished and 100 percent unsigned. Foreign Secretary Ma. Theresa Lazaro calls this progress. Technically, she is right. Politically, the missing 20 percent is the whole agreement.
The code has been pending since 1992 and under formal negotiation since 2017. After early efforts stalled, ASEAN and China signed a non-binding Declaration on Conduct in 2002, promising a code someday. Nine years into negotiations, they are still talking.
How can the CoC be finalized when China claims the entire South China Sea, and the West Philippine Sea with it? Only on Beijing’s terms, which is the problem. What China wants is a sequel to the toothless 2002 Declaration. It has no reason to accept a binding code anchored on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the 2016 Arbitral Award, the landmark ruling that affirmed Philippine sovereign rights within its exclusive economic zone.
Geographic scope shows the bind. A scope that names maritime zones concedes the Philippines’ entitlements, while one that stays vague preserves China’s ambiguity. Beijing will not sign the first, and Manila cannot sign the second.
So what would it take? First, one side must blink, and the evidence says it will not be China. Every year without a code is a year it can build, patrol, and water-cannon without a rulebook to be accused of breaking. A weak code is worse for Beijing than none because it would hand the claimants a yardstick.
Second, ASEAN must stop treating consensus as a virtue. The bloc cannot even agree that a binding text is desirable. Lazaro herself acknowledged that some members flinch at the ratification a binding instrument would require. Cambodia and Laos will not antagonize their principal patron, and even claimant states weigh trade against principle.
What are the chances under Singapore? Slim, and Manila should say so. Singapore is a skilled, cautious steward, but caution is not leverage. It has no appetite for confronting Beijing and no mandate to impose a text on reluctant members.
A signing in 2027, ASEAN’s 60th anniversary, is plausible only as a ceremony. The danger is a code signed on time that means nothing: non-binding, vague on scope, silent on the arbitral award. Better no code than a decorative one that lets China claim the diplomatic high ground while Filipino fishermen are still driven away from Bajo de Masinloc.
That is the deepest contradiction. ASEAN is asked to approve a code of restraint while the party it would restrain keeps harassing Filipino fishermen and Coast Guard personnel. Beijing cannot negotiate peace at the table and wage pressure at sea. Until the water cannons stop, every handshake in a conference room is a performance.
So what should Manila do? Keep pressing for a binding, UNCLOS-anchored text, and keep building what actually deters: coalition patrols, Task Force Philippines-style arrangements with Japan, Australia, and the United States, documentation of every incident, and a legal record that will outlast any chair. Those work whether or not Beijing signs.
The Code may yet be concluded, but only when China decides it serves its interests, or when the cost of refusing exceeds the cost of agreeing. Neither condition exists today. Until then, Singapore inherits 80 percent of a code without teeth, and Beijing keeps the only bite that matters.