Manila vis-a-vis a Blue U.S. Congress

Democrats have taken both chambers. The Associated Press called the Senate for the Democrats late Tuesday after Josh Turek beat Republican Rep. Ashley Hinson in Iowa — and the party also won the House. For Asia, and especially the Philippines, this is mostly good news, with caveats Manila should not ignore.

Start with defense, because that is what protects Filipino fishermen and soldiers. Nothing here should alarm Malacañang. The 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty does not depend on who is running Congress, and backing for Manila is one of the few genuinely bipartisan positions left in Washington.

The Philippines Enhanced Resilience Act, co-authored by Republican Sen. Bill Hagerty and Democratic Sen. Tim Kaine, authorizes $2.5 billion in Foreign Military Financing grants for 2026 to 2030, up to $500 million a year. It also requires annual spending plans and progress reports to Congress. A Democratic Congress will not gut that. It will audit it, and that is healthy.

But authorization is not appropriation. Democratic appropriators now control the purse. They are unlikely to cut Philippine aid, but they may attach conditions, and human rights language is likely it. Manila should prepare for questions it would rather avoid.

The sharper question is tariffs. Philippine exports faced a 19-percent rate from August 2025 until the US Supreme Court struck down the IEEPA tariffs 6-3 on 20 February 2026. Trump then pivoted to Section 122 and, once those expired in July, imposed Section 301 tariffs, leaving the Philippines at a 12.5-percent headline rate.

Can Democrats withdraw them? Not by themselves. Section 301 is an executive action. Repealing it requires legislation Trump would veto, and Democrats lack the two-thirds needed to override it.

What they can do is to hold hearings, subpoena the economic rationale, attach riders to must-pass bills, and legislate to reclaim Congress’s tariff power. In practice, relief will come from the courts and negotiation, not a floor vote.

The shift in leverage is political. A president weakened on living costs has less room to demand investment pledges and open-ended concessions from allies, and Manila can now negotiate with that in mind.

The wider Asian picture is similar. Democrats are likely to resist unilateral concessions to Beijing, which would reassure Tokyo, Seoul, and Manila that the China policy won’t be traded away in a summit handshake.

Tougher scrutiny of chip and AI export controls cuts both ways. It protects the integrity of supply chains the Philippines hopes to join, but it may also complicate a semiconductor ambition built on Washington’s goodwill, including the Pax Silica framework.

There are downsides, and these are real. Democrats are historically more protectionist on trade, with labor and environmental standards that can burden developing exporters.

A Congress devoted to investigations may distract an administration already stretched across Iran, Ukraine, and the Taiwan Strait.

A divided government also brings shutdown brinkmanship and policy unpredictability, hardly ideal for allies planning decades-long modernization.

There is also a quieter risk. Washington’s attention to the Philippines has been largely transactional, and a Congress more skeptical of “forced” investment deals may be less eager to reward them.

So is this a windfall for Manila? Not exactly. The Philippines gains leverage rather than largesse: a Congress that can check an unpredictable president, a defense relationship insulated from partisan swings, and a trade fight that may finally lose some of its menace.

But there are lessons to be learned and one of these, for Manila, is plain. Do not bet on a party. Bet on institutions, keep both aisles close, and expect Washington to treat us as a strategic asset only as long as we are useful to them.