Daily Tribune

OPINION

Conviction threshold’s two-way verification process

At no time and no person with typical reverence for the constitutional text ought to change 24 as the starting number, the independent variable in this case.

Primer Pagunuran · Oct 13, 2026, 1:55 AM

It begs emphasizing that Sections 2 and 4 of Article VI: The Legislative Department, Section 2 of Article XVIII: Transitory Provisions, and Section 3(6) of Article XI: Accountability of Public Officers gravitate around the indivisible “twenty-four Senators”; their term of office; that the first 12 with the highest number of votes elected in 1992 were to serve for six years and the remaining 12 for three years, and, most consequentially, “No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.”

It’s axiomatic in the 1987 Constitution that, as a rule, two-thirds of 24 is a function of 24. At no time and no person with typical reverence for the constitutional text ought to change 24 as the starting number, the independent variable in this case. Where the input is otherwise changed by means not even known to God, the resultant conviction threshold is regarded as irreverently contrived.

The parliamentary rule of “two-thirds” applies in more sections and articles of the Constitution, as follows: Section 16(3) on suspension or expulsion of a member for disorderly behavior (by each House); Section 23(1) declaring a state of war (both Houses in joint session); and Section 27(1) overriding a presidential veto, requiring reconsideration and approval by the originating House — all under Article VI.

Furthermore, two-thirds governs Section 11 on determining presidential inability over Cabinet contestation (both Houses) and Section 21 on concurrence for treaties or international agreements (Senate only) under Article VII: The Executive Department, whereas two-thirds again governs Section 3(6), conviction in an impeachment trial (Senate only), under Article XI.

Verily, the same rule controls Section 1(2), calling a Constitutional Convention via Congress, which requires a vote of two-thirds of all its members, whereas proposing amendments directly via a constituent assembly requires three-fourths under Article XVII: Amendments or Revisions — beyond any contemplation that any senator or more might have died, resigned, been expelled, or been convicted by final judgment.

This is the whole legal architecture upon which the parliamentary rule of two-thirds rests. Apparently, no amicus curiae brought this to light, albeit all these are matters of law that must not have escaped notice, much less rational consideration.

The purpose of an amicus curiae is “to inform the court as to facts or situations which may have escaped consideration or to remind the court of legal matters which have escaped its notice, and regarding which it appears to be in danger of making a wrong interpretation” (Covey, 1959, citing Bayley v Clark). It follows that the status of the amicus curiae “ends when he has pointed out the error or made his suggestion to the court.”

The “new controlling ruling,” voted 13-1, advanced the explanation of “legally and factually capable” as the pretext for the conviction threshold when it politically excluded four senator-members with luminous oppositionist persuasions.

Floating this novel “legal theory” of the impeachment court seemingly operates in a void, as the absence of the most fundamental axiom upon which it holds is akin to an ice floe that might crack or melt in the slightest heat.

An entire universe watched how the amici curiae interposed their opinions à la jurists or wise men of ancient Rome, priests or scholars of Western Europe in the Middle Ages, or those in the United States and the United Kingdom in the modern era.

Have they raised the level of discourse over the conviction threshold controversy? What information, education, or perspective have they lent that forthwith incentivized the impeachment court to lower the conviction threshold to less than 16, irrespective of who else may patently disagree?

In just a matter of time, this game will soon be over. What the senator-judges may have long nurtured in their minds — to convict Sara rather than acquit her — and the green light hoisted by the amici curiae have become a two-way verification process. Both modes prove compatible with the official worldview, reduced to the notion of anybody but Sara.