EDITORIAL
Trounced GOP won’t end war — or ASEAN’s nightmare
Start with what will not change. Congress has little say over how a president runs a war, and a Democratic House cannot rewrite foreign policy on its own.
If the Republicans lose the House, and perhaps the Senate, in November, Asia will not see a change in American policy. It would see a change in American certainty. For a region that lives on predictability, that matters more than any single tariff or deployment.
Start with what will not change. Congress has little say over how a president runs a war, and a Democratic House cannot rewrite foreign policy on its own. Containing China is one of the few things both parties will agree on. Nobody in Manila, Hanoi, or Jakarta should expect a Democratic wave to soften Washington’s line on Beijing.
What would change is the constraint. A Democratic House would hold hearings, issue subpoenas, and use the budget to pressure the White House. That is good news for Southeast Asia if it pushes Washington toward ending the Iran war.
Import-dependent economies pay for every barrel that costs more. Trade would be steadier too. A weakened president has less leverage, and Vietnam, Thailand, and Malaysia will stall on concessions, knowing time is on their side. The risk is a bruised president who will lash out abroad to look strong, and tariffs are his quickest lever.
Now for the Philippines, where the stakes are sharpest and the illusions most dangerous. Our officials like to say the alliance is “ironclad.” Nobody in Washington has to say so for it to be true on paper. The Mutual Defense Treaty stands, the EDCA sites exist, and the Typhon missile system is on our soil. Bipartisan support for all of it will survive a midterm rout.
But a treaty is a promise to respond, not a guarantee for how fast, how hard, or whether anyone is watching. The question is not whether Washington will honor its word. It is whether a president who has said he does not “think about” the hardship of his own voters will spend political capital on a rock in the Spratlys.
Beijing is asking the same question, and it reads American politics closely. A Washington tied down in the Gulf and fighting fires at home is the best time to test Ayungin and Scarborough.
Expect more water cannons, more blocking, and more gray-zone pressure calibrated to stay below the line that would trigger Article IV. Nobody in the Pentagon is going to rush to defend a resupply boat.
Manila has been too comfortable. We have leaned on American deterrence while our own capacity has lagged. Our Coast Guard is outgunned, our Navy is thin, and military modernization has crawled from one budget cycle to the next.
Meanwhile, billions went into flood control projects that cause floods anyway. A country that cannot find the money for its own ships should not lecture allies about commitment. Every peso lost to graft is a patrol boat we never bought.
The task for this government is plain. Build up our capacity to hold our own waters. Deepen ties with Japan, Australia, and others so our security will not depend on one country’s election calendar. Lock in the Visiting Forces arrangements with Tokyo and Canberra, and project the arbitral award in every forum available. And stop treating the alliance as a favor we are owed rather than a partnership we must earn.
Our guess is that a Democratic rout will not weaken America’s commitments in Asia so much as expose how much of those commitments rest on one man’s mood.
Congress will prop up the alliances and slow his worst impulses. It will not restore trust, and it will not defend Philippine waters for us.
Allies who wait to be rescued are usually disappointed. Those who show up prepared are the ones helped.