Where to?

Four days after the historic plebiscite, the Commission on Elections has deemed Republic Act 11054, commonly known as the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL) ratified, with more than 1.5 million voters manifesting their approval. Roughly 80 percent of the negative votes came from Sulu, the only province where the dissenters outnumbered BOL supporters.

“The first order of business will be levelling the expectations of its impoverished population to more realistic goals, based on a critical assessment

of resources… available for development programming.

On 6 February, the plebiscite was held in the towns of Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and Tangkal in Lanao del Norte and 39 barangays in the towns of Aleosan, Carmen, Kabacan, Midsayap, Pigkawayan and Pikit in North Cotabato. Local residents decided the inclusion of their communities in the autonomy. Most analysts predicted a favorable outcome in these areas.

Under the BOL, the current regional government will cease to exist by 30 June 2019.

Meanwhile, the 80-member Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) will be constituted to take charge of the autonomous region until parliament has been elected in May 2022.

The BTA, appointed by the President, will have 41 members, including its chair, representing the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. For genuine inclusiveness, the BTA members should equitably represent other key stakeholders in the region — the Moro National Liberation Front, women, religious, youth, civil society, traditional leaders, indigenous peoples and Muslim tribes. Gender advocates would wish for a substantial, if not equal, number of seats allocated to women, not the random token few that has been par for the course in the previous regional governments.

The BTA is tasked to set the foundation for a stronger, viable autonomy. This warrants a meticulously thought-out organizational plan, not just mirroring the infrastructure of national government, by creating regional versions of line agencies. This did not work for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Instead, the BTA must ascertain the most suitable governance structure, nuanced by the culture, developmental requirements and absorptive capacities of the region and its constituencies. Moreover, the BTA will have to draw up indispensable regulatory frameworks, such as the region’s administrative, local government and electoral codes.

An effective governance structure focuses on the current conditions of the region even as it strives to address the aspirations of its peoples. The BOL is not the cure-all for the abysmal state of the region. The first order of business will be levelling the expectations of its impoverished population to more realistic goals, based on a critical assessment of resources, natural and human, available for development programming. This also entails an inventory of all ARMM properties, including an audit of its human resources.

In setting priorities, reference should be made to the Bangsamoro Development Plan, crafted by the Bangsamoro Development Agency with assistance from economists, local stakeholders and other specialists.

Lastly, amid conflicting political interests, the BTA must secure broad support for BOL’s implementation. As quid pro quo, political clans may seek seats in the BTA or parliament warlords, the retention of firearms and for other actors, the maintenance of the status quo.

Acquiescing to any of the foregoing may decimate the support of the public clamoring for change. Quo vadis, Bangsamoro?